Non-technical abstract
The paper considers the pros and cons for Canada of monetary union between Canada and the U.S. Many of the arguments would be applicable also to the case of a wider North American Monetary Union involving the U.S., Canada and Mexico. The current Canadian monetary arrangements, a flexible exchange rate and an inflation target, are contrasted both The optimal currency area arguments (which concern the macroeconomic stabilisation aspects of a permanently fixed exchange rate) probably favour either form of monetary union.
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A flexible exchange rate is a potentially useful shock absorber when a nation or region is hit by asymmetric shocks to the demand for or supply of goods and services. Non-synchronised national or regional business cycles are one manifestation of such asymmetric shocks or asymmetric transmission mechanism. In practice, the shock absorber properties of a flexible exchange rate are dominated by the extraneous instability and excess volatility inherent in a market-determined exchange rate when financial markets are highly integrated. Canada has a somewhat larger natural resource-based sector than the US, which means it is more likely to be subject to supply shocks and world commodity price shocks. Against that, a flexible exchange rate can be a source of commodity price shocks in domestic currency, even when world commodity prices are stable. The fact that the lion's share of Canada's trade is with the US is neither here nor there. If there were frequent and significant asymmetric shocks requiring an adjustment of Canadian-U.S. relative prices, a flexible exchange rate would be optimal even if 100% of Canada's trade were with the U.S.
Limited labour mobility and the absence of a North American Federal budget with serious redistributive powers are no obstacle to monetary union. For labour mobility to mimic a flexible nominal exchange rate, significant net migration flows would have to take place at cyclical frequencies. In existing currency unions, such as the U.S. and Canada, labour mobility is a useful mechanism for structural adjustment, but not an effective cyclical stabilisation tool. This means either that these existing currency unions are themselves not optimal currency areas, or that labour mobility is not essential for monetary union. I favour the second interpretation.
Prelude
Before I get to the subject of this lecture, I would like to say a few words about the man whose memory we honour with this lecture series. Doug Purvis was my friend. I first met him when I was a graduate student at Yale in the early seventies. Our research interests overlapped, and I was fortunate enough to co-author a paper with him (Buiter and Purvis [1983] ). Doug was a very fine economist, with an uncanny knack for stripping away the inessential in order to focus, in the most transparent manner, on the key issues. He never carried this Chicago discipline ('when in doubt, leave it out') to the point that model building became art for art's sake only. He was invariably motivated by the key macroeconomic policy issues of the day. Indeed, he was passionate about the use of economic theory as a tool for improving the conduct of economic policy and the quality of life. I like to think of this as a Yale contribution to his intellectual capital. His activities as an policy adviser, in Canada and abroad, bear testimony to his ability to arbitrage effectively between the domains of scholarship and policy advice. His unexpected, tragic death was a terrible blow for all those who knew and loved him. He left the world a better, but also a rather emptier place. I will always miss his larger than life presence, his warmth, his wit and the quality of his intellect.
How wonderful it would have been to be able to hear his views on North American Monetary Union! I am honoured to have been asked to contribute to this lecture series. 1 Technically, the national central banks are the shareholders of the ECB. The Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties distinguish between the ECB and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), the collective of the ECB and the national central banks. In publications of the ECB and in public statements of its Executive Board members, there are frequent references to the 'Eurosystem' (an obvious echo of the Federal Reserve System). Each national central bank provides one member of the decision-making Governing Council of the ECB (which consists of the 11 national central bank governors and 6 executive board members) and certain aspects of the implementation of the centrally determined monetary policy are administratively decentralised through the ncbs. None of this detracts from the reality that the ECB/ESCB is a 'unitary' central bank. Monetary policy authority is unambiguously centralised in Frankfurt and, the ncbs have effectively become the regional branch banks of the ECB.
(I) Introduction
Currency regimes are under review everywhere. Not only in transition economies, developing countries and emerging market economies, but also in some of the most industrially advanced countries of the world. On January 1, 1999, eleven of the fifteen EU members successfully launched their common currency, the euro by pooling their national monetary sovereignties in a common, supranational monetary sovereignty, institutionally expressed in a 'unitary' supranational central bank, the European Central Bank (ECB), with the member national central banks (ncbs) reduced to a role rather like that of regional reserve banks in the Federal Reserve System.
1
In view of these epochal changes taking place in Western Europe, it is not surprising that the question has been raised as to whether EMU might be an appropriate model for North America (the USA, Canada and Mexico).
2 In what follows I will review the main issues that determine the answer to that question. My discussion will mainly focus on the pros and cons of monetary union between the USA and Canada, although many of the relevant considerations are applicable to Mexican membership in a North American Monetary Union 3 The target for inflation is supposed to be a range for the annual proportional rate of increase in the CPI of between 1 and 3 percent. It is unclear whether this target range is symmetric around 2 percent. My reading of the recent policy record and of statements by top officials from the Central Bank of Canada and the Federal ministry of finance suggest that a given positive deviation from 2 percent inflation would be frowned upon more than an equal negative deviation. 4 Formal symmetry means that participating nation states share in the costs and benefits of the monetary union in a way that represents their economic size or weight, and that their representation on the decision making council of the supranational central bank (the NAMUFed) likewise reflects their economic importance in the union. Clearly, in a formally symmetric union between countries of very different economic size, the larger member(s) will be the dominant partners. In a NAMU, the USA would effectively run the show. 5 For concreteness, I will only consider the case of a unilateral adoption of the US dollar by Canada. The case of a unilateral adoption by the US of the Canadian dollar would be more fun, but less relevant. Henceforth, dollarisation means US-dollarisation. There is no modern central bank that does not have price stability as at least one of its
targets. An interpretation of the current Canadian monetary arrangements as one of pursuing 7 I must confess, however, to still being quite befuddled about the meaning and role of the monetary conditions index in the conduct of Canadian monetary policy (see Freedman [1995] ).
8 I am restricting the discussion to market-based methods of monetary control. Credit rationing etc. are not considered. 4 the objective of price stability through a low target for the inflation rate of a broadly based consumer price index, containing both domestically produced and imported goods and services, seems reasonable (see e.g. Thiessen [1998 Thiessen [ , 1999 and Freedman [1995] 
Arguments (IIA) The microeconomics of a common currency
The transactions cost saving advantages of a common currency are familiar. A medium of exchange or transactions medium is subject to a network externality (Dowd and Greenaway [1993] ). The usefulness to me of a medium of exchange is increasing in the number of other economic agents likely to accept it as a medium of exchange. By eliminating the need for the exchange of one currency for another, real resource costs are saved. From a microeconomic efficiency point of view, if one were to design the world from scratch, a single currency would be adopted.
If the status quo is a situation in which there are multiple national currencies, the permanent flow of transaction cost savings from having a common currency have to be balanced against the one-off, up-front switch over costs of moving to a common currency.
For Canada, these switch over costs are likely to be lower than for the countries that joined in EMU, since most Canadians are familiar with the US dollar already. Little can be said about the magnitude of the resource savings involved. The spreads in the foreign exchange markets will understate the true cost because it ignores the 'in-house' costs incurred by the non-bank parties in the foreign exchange transactions. It overestimates the true costs to the extent that there are monopoly profits or X-inefficiency in the foreign exchange markets.
In its report One market, one money (European Economy [1990] Table 1 below).
The magnitude of the switching costs for Canada are even harder to estimate. In the case of EMU, competing estimates differed by one and sometimes two orders of magnitude.
The switching costs do not just involve the administrative and hardware cost of redenominating all contracts, changing vending machines etc. but also the psychological costs of having to compute prices with a new numeraire. With boundedly rational individuals, these costs will always be there, but they are likely to be less significant in the case of Canada adopting the US dollar, because most Canadians are already very familiar with this currency.
Adopting an altogether new currency would involve higher re-computation costs of this kind.
A final microeconomic benefit from a common currency is the greater price transparency it creates. Price discrimination and market segmentation are discouraged when
buyers can more easily engage in comparison shopping. Again, this argument relies on bounded rationality, and the magnitude of these benefits is anyone's guess.
(IIB) Seigniorage
There are several ways of measuring the resources appropriated by the state through the issuance of non-interest-bearing liabilities. In Canada, both components of the monetary base (currency and banks' balances with the central bank) are unremunerated, so one straightforward measure of state revenue from the activities of the central bank is simply the change in the monetary base. To get a sense of magnitude, it is helpful to express this as a fraction of nominal GDP. Letting M t denote the nominal stock of base money at the end of period t, P the price level and Y real GDP, I defined seigniorage, , as follows:
An alternative measure considers the interest bill foregone by having non-interestbearing rather than interest-bearing liabilities. I denote this . Let i be the short risk-free nominal interest rate, then A related measure of the monetary revenue of the state is the inflation tax, the reduction in the purchasing value of the outstanding stock of base money. I will refer to this
as the anticipated inflation tax, denoted . Let be the rate of inflation 11 , then
The three measures are related. Let m be the base money-GDP ratio 12 and g the growth rate of real GDP 13 , then and Whatever the measure one uses, the revenues from the national printing presses are small beer for both Canada and the USA, although they have been more important for
Mexico. Table 1 ** Interest rate is 1 year TB rate *** Inflation rate is CPI inflation rate If Canada were to be able to negotiate a population-based or GDP-based share of NAMU-wide seigniorage, it could gain more seigniorage revenue than under national 15 In 1998, Canada's population size was 11.34% of US population size. Canada's 1997 GDP was 8.14% of US GDP (using PPP measures). US seigniorage (the change in the stock of currency) for the past 5 years is shown in the Whatever the merits of this literature, the data make it clear that modern industrial states with well-developed financial systems do not make use of the inflation tax to any significant extent.
I conclude that loss of national discretion over seigniorage is not an economic obstacle to monetary union in North America, especially if a reasonable sharing rule is in place to distributed NAMU-wide seigniorage among the participants. Countries that decide to 'dollarise' unilaterally, say by declaring the US dollar to be (the only) legal tender in their jurisdiction, can of course not count on any share of dollar seigniorage and would be worse off.
The loss of national control over the national inflation rate could be more costly from the point of view of the broadly defined inflation tax, which consists not only of the reduction in the purchasing power of the national base money stock (the anticipated inflation tax) but includes the reduction in the market value of all nominally denominated government debt, including its interest-bearing liabilities (the unanticipated inflation tax). One can visualise dire circumstances when the ability to impose a capital levy on the holders of nominal public debt (especially longer-maturity debt) through an unexpected increase in the inflation rate might be a valuable policy instrument.
(IIC) Financial stability: the lender of last resort
The state has a unique responsibility for dealing with systemic financial instability.
The reason is that the state has deeper pockets than any private domestic agent. The state has the monopoly of the legitimate use of coercion and force. This is expressed through its power to tax, to declare certain of its liabilities to be legal tender, and to regulate. The central bank is the state agency with the short-term deep pockets, derived from its ability to issue legal tender. If a financial crisis is not a short-lived phenomenon (a liquidity or rollover crisis), but becomes a long-term solvency crisis for a substantial part of the financial sector, the shortterm deep pockets of the central bank must be supplemented with the long-term deep pockets of the ministry of finance. A central bank that attempts to recapitalize a sizeable chunk of a bankrupt private financial sector's balance sheet would undermine its own solvency. Since the central bank does not itself have the power to tax, central bank solvency could be safeguarded only be continued monetary issuance, which would be inflationary. Noninflationary recapitalisation of a bankrupt financial system requires the resources of the state agency with the long-term deep pockets: the ministry of finance with its power to tax.
To a minor extent, the lender of last resort function can be 'privatised', through deposit insurance, the arranging of contingent credit lines etc. The ministry of finance could, if faced with a domestic financial crisis, borrow US dollars and perform the lender of last resort function with these borrowed resources. For truly systemic financial crises this may be inadequate. There is no adequate substitute, in the short run, for the ability to create your own legal tender in unlimited quantities.
A country (Canada, say) that unilaterally adopts another country's currency (the USA, say) as its national currency, there is no guarantee whatsoever that the central bank of the country whose currency it has adopted will be willing to act as a lender of last resort for its 16 My rather sanguine view of the costs associated with the pursuit of price stability is by no means universally shared. For a contrary opinion see e.g. Osberg and Fortin eds [1998] . Targeting very low inflation does increase the risk that the economy will end up in a liquidity trap. For a discussion of this issue see Buiter and Panigirtzoglou [1999] . 14 financial institutions. Unilateral dollarisation of this kind therefore carries a very high price tag. The discount window is closed forever and there is no lender of last resort. I therefore assume that the only kind of NAMU Canada might be interested in, would be a symmetric monetary union, where the NAMUFed would act as lender of last resort vis-à-vis Canadian financial institutions in exactly the same way as it would vis-à-vis US financial institutions.
How this could be achieved without far-reaching political integration is an issue discussed at greater length in Section III below.
(IID) Macroeconomic Stabilisation: the theory of optimal currency areas revisited
My first maintained hypothesis in what follows is that the current Canadian monetary arrangement (a floating exchange rate with inflation targeting) is capable of delivering, on average and in a sustained manner, an acceptably stable rate of inflation compatible with most reasonable definitions of price stability. The record of the last 10 years or so supports this assumption, as seen in Table 2 , which also suggests that this price stability has not been purchased at the cost of sustained lower growth or higher unemployment. 16 TABLE 2 Inflation, Growth and Unemployment in Canada, 1980 Av. 1980 / 89 1990 1991 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Granted then that both the current regime and monetary union with the USA can deliver price stability, the macroeconomic stability issue can be narrowed down to the question as to which regime is more likely to stabilise the real economy, that is, which regime is more likely to avoid or minimise deviations of unemployment from the natural rate or departures of actual from capacity output.
My second maintained hypothesis is that the choice of exchange rate regime will have no significant impact on the path of capacity output or on the natural rate of unemployment. I therefore rule out a long-run non-vertical Phillips curve and hysteresis in the natural rate of unemployment. The theory of optimal currency areas (Mundell [1961] , McKinnon [1963] , Ingram
[1969], Kenen [1969] , Masson and Taylor [1992] ) is one of the low points of post-World War II monetary economics. Its key failure is a chronic confusion between transitory nominal rigidities and permanent real rigidities. The result is a greatly overblown account of the power of monetary policy to affect real economic performance, for good or for bad.
The optimal currency area literature asks which of a set of national (or regional) economies each of which has its own national (regional) currency, would benefit from having irrevocably fixed exchange rates with one or more of the other currencies. The following characteristics of either the individual national economies or the multi-country system as a whole, have been argued to favour retention of the national currency, and the associated scope for nominal exchange rate flexibility.
(1) A high degree of nominal rigidity in domestic prices and/or costs.
(2) A relatively low degree of openness to trade in real goods and services.
(3) A high incidence of asymmetric (nation-specific) shocks rather than symmetric or common shocks and/or dissimilarities in national economic structures or transmission mechanisms that causes even symmetric shocks to have asymmetric consequences.
(4) A less diversified structure of production and demand.
(5) A low degree of real factor mobility (especially labour mobility) across national boundaries.
(6) Absence of significant international (and supra-national) fiscal tax-transfer mechanisms.
(IID1) How important are nominal cost and price rigidities in Canada?
If there are no significant nominal cost and price rigidities, the exchange rate regime is a matter of supreme macroeconomic insignificance. Only the microeconomic transactions and switch over costs matter. A country can be mired in real rigidities, and its real economic performance will be miserable. Unless these real rigidities can be addressed effectively through nominal exchange rate variations, its performance will be equally miserable with a common currency, an independent national currency and a floating exchange rate, or with a system of universal bilateral barter.
The severity and persistence of nominal rigidities therefore becomes a key empirical and policy issue. Unfortunately, the available empirical evidence is extremely opaque and very hard to interpret. Information on the duration of nominal wage and price contracts and on the extent to which they are synchronised or staggered is subject to an obvious application of the Lucas critique. These contracting practices are not facts of nature, but the outcomes of purposeful choices. Changes in the economic environment conditioning these choices will change the practices.
Testing price and wage data for persistence is equally unlikely to be enlightening. The pattern of serial correlation in the data reflects both 'true' structural lags, invariant under changes in the economic environment, and expectational dynamics that will not be invariant when the rules of the game are changed. There is no deep theory of nominal rigidities worth the name. This leaves the economics profession in an uncomfortable position. We believe the numeraire matters, although we cannot explain why (using conventional economic tools).
We believe that nominal wage and price rigidities are common and that they matter for real economic performance, but we do not know how to measure these rigidities, nor how stable they are likely to be under the kind of policy regime changes that are under discussion. The answer to this key question therefore is: we don't know.
(IID2) Is Canada Too Small and/or Too Open to Benefit From Exchange Rate

Flexibility?
A common theme in most Optimal Currency Area approaches is that an economy that is more open to trade in goods and services will lose less when it gives up its national currency. It should be obvious that this proposition cannot be correct as stated. This geographical concentration of its exports and imports does not mean that a fixed exchange rate with the USA would be desirable. If there are frequent and severe shocks to the demand for or supply of exportables and importables, shocks that necessitate a change in the relative price of imports and exports, a floating exchange rate vis-à-vis the USA would be desirable. This is a direct application of the 'asymmetric shocks' argument against a common currency, discussed at greater length below. Thus, even if 100% of Canada's trade were with the USA, this could either be an argument for a common currency (if there are few and only minor asymmetric shocks necessitating a change in the relative price of US and Canadian goods) or a case against it (if frequent and large asymmetric shocks impact on this trading relationship).
I conclude that neither the degree of openness of the Canadian economy nor the concentration of its exports and imports on the USA have any obvious bearing on the desirability of Canada joining a NAMU.
(IID3) Is Canada Subject to Asymmetric Shocks that Make Monetary Union with the
USA Especially Costly?
The 'one-size fits all' monetary policy corset inflicted on all members of a monetary 21 union is most costly to a member state if it is subject to especially severe asymmetric shocks or if its structure is such as to cause even symmetric or common shocks to have seriously asymmetric impacts on output and employment. The proposition that a monetary union is more attractive when the structure of production and demand is well-diversified should be seen as a statement about the conditions under which asymmetric shocks are less likely.
It is true that giving up nominal exchange rate flexibility would deprive Canada of a mechanism for responding to asymmetric shocks. While nominal exchange rate flexibility does not reduce the long-term pain of changing relative costs or prices, it can, if used properly, reduce the transitional costs of achieving the real adjustment that is required. How serious this loss is depends on how well, in practice, this mechanism has been used.
A frequently heard argument is that Canada is likely to be subject to asymmetric supply shocks. This is because it has a large commodity producing sector (oil, gas, other natural resources and agriculture) that is subject to 'technological' shocks such as the weather, and to global price shocks. Not only are primary sectors argued to be more prone to supply shocks, than the secondary (manufacturing) , tertiary (market services) and quarternary (non-market services) sectors, output in these sectors is typically viewed as supplydetermined rather than demand-determined. Price determination in markets for primary products is also assumed to be close to the 'law of one price' characteristic of integrated markets for homogeneous goods with effective spatial arbitrage.
These characteristics of the primary sectors are clearly potentially relevant to Canada's status as an optimal currency area. However, agriculture's share in Canadian GDP (3% in 1996) is no higher than that of most advanced industrial countries. Mining accounts for a larger share of GDP (13% in 1996) , but, like all modern industrial nations, Canada is overwhelmingly a service economy (67% of GDP). 20 Like other financial markets, the foreign exchange markets denote at times beset by "disorderly market conditions", in which spreads widen to the point that transactions dry up and the market ceases to be efficient, even in the narrow technical sense.
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It should also be noted, that a flexible exchange rate can be a source of commodity price shocks (for given world commodity prices) as well as a means of responding to changes in world commodity prices.
There are two further considerations that qualify the practical importance of the asymmetric shocks argument in favour of retaining nominal exchange rate flexibility.
Nominal exchange rate changes are the appropriate response only to asymmetric shocks to the markets for goods and services, that is, to IS shocks and aggregate supply shocks. In response to asymmetric monetary shocks (LM shocks), a constant nominal interest rate is appropriate.
In a world with perfect international financial capital mobility, a constant nominal interest rate translates into a constant expected rate of exchange rate depreciation. A fixed exchange rate is one way of delivering this optimal response to LM shocks. 19 Second, it is important not to be excessively impressed with the efficiency of financial markets in general, and with the efficiency of the foreign exchange market in particular.
Most of the time, the foreign exchange market is technically efficient, in the sense that large transactions can be made almost instantaneously, at very low transactions costs and with a minimal impact on the exchange rate. 20 Even if the foreign exchange market is technically efficient (in the weak, semi-strong or even the strong sense) and no risk-adjusted pure profits can be made, the price established in this technically efficient market may not convey the right social scarcity valuation. Rational speculative bubbles can cause an asset price like the exchange rate to differ from its fundamental valuation. Departures from technical efficiency 23 also are common. Herding instinct, bandwagon effects and other irrational behaviour, noise traders, panic traders and traders caught in a liquidity squeeze in other financial market make for excessive volatility and sometimes quite persistent misalignments in the foreign exchange markets.
The foreign exchange market and the exchange rate can therefore be a source of extraneous shocks as well as a mechanism for adjusting to fundamental shocks. One cannot have the one without the other. The potential advantages of nominal exchange rate flexibility as an effective adjustment mechanism or shock absorber are bundled with the undoubted disadvantages of excessive noise and unwarranted movements in the exchange rate, inflicting unnecessary real adjustments on the rest of the economy. It is by no means clear that the advantages of nominal exchange rate flexibility when faced with fundamental asymmetric shocks dominate its disadvantages as a source of extraneous asymmetric shocks.
(IID4) Is Limited Real Resource Mobility an Obstacle to NAMU?
It is clear that a high degree of real factor mobility can be an effective substitute for nominal exchange rate adjustments in the face of asymmetric shocks. Indeed, factor mobility permits long-term, even permanent real adjustments to asymmetric real shocks, something nominal exchange flexibility cannot deliver. permits are a thing of the past, and mutual recognition of professional qualifications is becoming the norm rather than the exception.
Unless monetary union between the US and Canada were to be accompanied by the complete removal of legal and administrative obstacles to cross-border labour mobility, it is very unlikely that labour mobility could become an effective substitute for nominal exchange rate flexibility. Even with unrestricted cross-border labour mobility, it is unlikely that labour 25 mobility could mimic the impact of variations in the nominal exchange rate. Migration is costly, within as well as between nations. Workers are only likely to move if the fixed, upfront cost of moving is compensated for by a long period of higher earnings in the country of destination. Permanent (or at least persistent) real shocks will trigger labour mobility.
Nominal exchange rate flexibility only affects the real economy for a short transition period.
To mimic the effect of nominal exchange rate flexibility, net cross-border migration flows would have to be reversible and significant at cyclical frequencies. It is hard to see that happening.
I conclude that cross-border mobility of real capital and of labour between the US and Canada is unlikely to be an effective substitute for nominal exchange rate flexibility.
However, I doubt that even within existing currency unions (like the USA), net interregional migration flows are quantitatively important at cyclical frequencies. This means one of two things. Either, these existing currency unions are not optimal currency areas or an optimal currency area does not require a high degree of labour mobility at cyclical frequencies.
(IID5) Is a Strong NAMU Federal Fiscal Authority Necessary to Compensate for the
Loss of the Exchange Rate Instrument?
The brief answer is 'no'. Fiscal stabilisation policy works if and to the extent that postponing taxes, and borrowing to finance the resulting revenue shortfall, boosts aggregate demand. This will be the case either if there is myopia among consumers, who fail to realise that the present value of current and future taxes need not be affected by the timing of taxes, or if postponing taxes redistributes resources between households with different propensities to consume. In overlapping generations models without an operative intergenerational gift motive, postponing taxes redistributes resources from the young to the old and from 26 generations yet to be born to generations already alive. This will boost aggregate consumption in the short run. Intra-cohort heterogeneity (say through the coexistence of lifecycle consumers and current disposable income constrained consumers) can reinforce these effects.
Unless the supranational Federal Fiscal Authority in a currency union has access to the financial markets on terms that are superior to those enjoyed by the national fiscal authorities, there is nothing the Federal authorities can achieve by way of fiscal stabilisation that cannot be achieved equally well by national or even lower-tier fiscal authorities.
National government financial deficits and surpluses, probably mirrored to some extent in national current account imbalances, are a perfect substitute for supranational fiscal stabilisation.
A study by Bayoumi and Masson [1993] , building on earlier work by Sala-i-Martin and Sachs [1992] , analyses regional flows of federal taxes and transfers within the US and Canada. They try to distinguish between long-term fiscal flows (the redistributive element)
an short-term responses to regional business cycles, which they identify with the stabilisation element. They find that in the US, long-run flows amount to 22 cents in the dollar while the stabilisation element is 31 cents in the dollar. For Canada, the corresponding figures are 39 cents and 17 cents respectively. While interesting, these studies tell us nothing of relevance to the issue of whether fiscal policy in an NAMU could compensate for the loss of the exchange rate instrument. The long-term redistribution properties of the budget are irrelevant, because the nominal exchange rate is not an instrument for long-term redistribution. The stabilisation properties of the fiscal system do matter, but the necessary stabilisation can be provided at the supranational, national or sub-national level.
It is true that, to the extent that monetary union is part of a wider process of political integration, the political pressures may grow for long-term redistribution among the nations that constitute the monetary union. What the redistribution figures in the studies of Bayoumi and Masson and of Sala-i-Martin an Sachs tell us, is the degree to which the United States and Canada are societies, rather than just economies, and the extent to which notions of national solidarity and regional social cohesion are translated into redistributive measures through the tax-transfer mechanism.
I conclude that the likely continued absence of a strong North American Fiscal Authority with serious transnational tax and transfer powers, is not a technical, economic obstacle to NAMU.
(III) Political and Constitutional Aspects of Monetary Union
Monetary union is not just a technical economic, financial or monetary issue. It represents a very significant constitutional and political change. Monetary union raises two distinct but related political and constitutional issues: first the legitimacy of the surrender of national sovereignty involved in NAMU, and second the accountability of the monetary policy makers to the electorate or its elected representatives.
(III.1) National sovereignty
Monetary union represents a surrender of national sovereignty to a supranational entity. This is true even for the full, formally symmetric monetary union that I have focused on. A central bank is a key agent of the state. The ability to issue legal tender is an expression of the power of the state to coerce, to prescribe and proscribe behaviour. The common use of the term 'seigniorage' to refer to the revenues accruing to the state through its monopoly of legal 22 In the context of European monetary integration, I have been an enthusiastic supporter of the surrender of national sovereignty involved in EMU. The reason is overwhelmingly political: fear and loathing of the unparalleled destructive capacities of European nationalism. German political re-unification in 1990 coincided with monetary union between the former West and East Germanies (GEMU). This is not an event with any clear implications for EMU, since GEMU was little more than a take-over of a near-bankrupt East Germany by West Germany.
There have been exceptions to the rule that political unification precedes monetary union. Even if one ignores the ambiguous German 19 th century experience, the seven provinces that formed the Dutch Republic established a monetary union with only the weakest (con)federal political institutions and with almost completely decentralised fiscal authority. It lasted for two centuries, until the conquest of the Republic by Napoleon (Dormans [1991] 30 See e.g. Tietmeyer [1998a,b] . For a general discussion see Eichengreen [1996] . 31 There have been times, however, that the economics got too far ahead of the politics. The Werner Group's recommendation in 1970 of full monetary union by 1980 clearly was a bridge too far at the time. 29 All three political break-ups lead to hyperinflations.
Czechoslovakia broke up as a political union on January 1, 1993; the Czech-Slovak monetary union collapsed on February 8, 1993 (Fidrmuc and Horváth [1998] Unilateral 'dolarisation', where a 'peripheral' country simply adopts the currency of another ('centre') nation, without a fair share of the common seigniorage, without access to the discount window and other lender of last resort facilities, and without a voice in the decision making processes of the centre country's central bank would not make economic sense. While the macroeconomic stability arguments and the microeconomic resource savings arguments would still favour monetary union, the seigniorage and lender of last resort considerations would dominate. Unilateral dollarisation should be of interest only to a chronically mismanaged economic basket case, whose sole hope of achieving monetary 33 I have been assured that split infinitives are acceptable now. 37 stability is to unilaterally surrender monetary sovereignty. 33 Neither Canada nor Mexico fall into that category.
While the economic pros and cons of NAMU are rather finely balanced, the political arguments against it appear to be overwhelming. The absence of effective North Americawide political institutions means that there could be no effective political accountability of the NAMUFed. The surrender of political sovereignty inherent in NAMU would therefore not be perceived as legitimate by a sophisticated citizenry, used to accountability as a right, not as an optional extra..
Critics of EMU have pointed out that the EMU is a small, flightless bird, surviving precariously in arid surroundings. I actually believe that the EMU will fly, and that it will prosper, because it is part of an ongoing process of political unification in Europe. NAMU, however, will not fly, except as part of a wider political movement towards far-reaching political integration, a United States of North America. And there is no sign of that.
